This is the second of two articles on academic freedom. The was first published here: https://privateeducationmalaysia.blogspot.com/2026/11/case-note-professor-datuk-dr-massila.html The final piece will be published on 21/11/26
Much of the government’s recent push to repeal the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (AUKU) and draft a new One Higher Education Act (OHEA) rests on a sudden awakening to student freedoms. While dismantling patriarchal control over young adults is welcome, however belatedly it arrives, that reform will be meaningless if the new law leaves intact an autocratic brand of university autonomy that suppresses the rights of academics.
Two recent High Court
rulings arising out of Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka (UTeM)—Azlianor
Abdul Aziz v. UTeM MLRHU 1902 and Professor Datuk Dr Massila Kamalrudin
v. Datuk Haryaty Hamdzah MLRHU 2809—offer timely judicial opinion for getting this balance right in the upcoming higher education legislation.
1. From Collegial
Autonomy to Managerial Autocracy
The facts that led to Azlianor
are not an isolated incident in our public universities; they are the legal symptom
of a decades-long shift in Malaysian higher education from collegial self-governance to managerial autocracy.
In Azlianor, a
senior lecturer challenged administrative circulars making indexed journal publications
mandatory for annual appraisals. The High Court dismissed the judicial review, holding
that setting academic standards and KPIs falls within a university’s internal
autonomy and is not amenable to administrative court interference.
Taken on its own, Azlianor
reflects how "autonomy" has been captured by university management.
Over the past thirty years, successive amendments to AUKU and the rise of
corporate KPI culture have jettisoned collegial governance. Today,
"autonomy" is increasingly invoked by Vice-Chancellors and university
boards to exercise top-down executive control by enforcing rigid performance
regimes through unilateral administrative circulars (surat pekeliling).
When courts defer to those directives as "internal academic matters,"
university autonomy becomes managerial autocracy with the freedom for
administrators to govern by decree, with no institutional protection for the
academics subjected to them.
2. Ministerial
Control and the Paralysis of the National Council on Higher Education
This internal
managerial autocracy does not exist in a vacuum; it is the direct downstream
result of ministerial centralisation and a systemic rupture at the top
of Malaysia’s higher education system.
Under Section 3 of
AUKU and the National Council on Higher Education Act 1996, the
Minister’s power of "general direction" over higher education was
never meant to be absolute. By law, the Minister must act in accordance with
national policies, strategies, and guidelines formulated by the National
Council on Higher Education (NCHE), a statutory buffer designed to ensure
policy continuity and insulate universities from partisan or ministerial or
political whims.
In practice, however,
the NCHE has been sidelined and left dormant for over a decade. Combined with
the Minister’s exclusive powers under AUKU to appoint Vice-Chancellors, Deputy
Vice-Chancellors, and university board members, this statutory vacuum has
ruptured the higher education system. Without an independent national council
mediating policy, ministerial priorities, and budget allocations, tied heavily
to global rankings and publication metrics, are transmitted directly to
Vice-Chancellors, who owe their appointments upward to Putrajaya rather than
inward to their academic peers. Vice-Chancellors, in turn, act as
administrative enforcers of those metrics on campus.
3. The Forgotten
Constitutional Architecture of the University
What makes this
top-down chain of command especially striking is that it runs counter to the
statutory design of public universities themselves.
Under AUKU’s
prescribed University Constitution (the First Schedule), a public university is
not legally structured as a corporate hierarchy ruled by a Chief Executive.
Rather, the Constitution establishes a collegial governance system built around
a conglomeration of distinct "Authorities"—including the Board of
Directors, the Senate, the Management Committee, the Faculties, the Studies
Committees, and Welfare Committees. Each authority is vested with its own
defined sphere of powers, alongside internal dispute-resolution and appeal
mechanisms.
In that constitutional
design, academic standards and scholarly affairs belong to the Senate and the
Faculties, not unilateral executive circulars. Over time, however, this
distributed separation of powers has been overlooked, not only by university
administrators, but often by academic staff themselves. Because these internal
constitutional boundaries are rarely pleaded or argued before the courts,
judges have come to treat "the University" as legally synonymous with
"the Vice-Chancellor," inadvertently validating executive
centralisation under the banner of university autonomy.
4. Massila
Splits Institutional Power from Scholarly Speech
This is why the High
Court’s subsequent ruling in Massila Kamalrudin v. Haryaty Hamdzah is so
vital. When UTeM’s Vice-Chancellor sought a pre-trial gag order to silence
public criticism of her administration’s KPI regime, promotion exercises, and
subsidiary governance, Judicial Commissioner Raja Segaran S Krishnan refused.
In doing so, the Court
drew a crucial constitutional line between institutional governance and public
discourse:
- "Judicial review and public discourse
occupy different provinces." That a university policy is legally valid under administrative law
does not insulate its wisdom, fairness, or human impact from public
debate.
- Public funding invites public scrutiny. Because public universities are
maintained by taxpayer money, the stewardship of university funds,
appraisal regimes, and leadership conduct are "quintessentially a
matter of public interest."
- High office requires thicker skin. Far from treating the Vice-Chancellor’s
stature as a reason to suppress critics, the Court held that holding high
public office invites constant scrutiny under Article 10(1)(a) (Freedom
of Speech of the Federal Constitution—even when criticism is expressed
in trenchant or angry terms.
5. Five Lessons for
the Proposed One Higher Education Act (OHEA)
The Ministry of Higher
Education has indicated that the upcoming OHEA aims to recognise academics
beyond a basic "employer-employee relationship" and review
lecturers' obligations under the Statutory Bodies (Discipline and Surcharge)
Act 2000 (Act 605). To make that promise meaningful, lawmakers must address
both the top-down ministerial grip and the bottom-up silencing of scholars:
- End Ministerial Patronage and Restore an
Independent Policy Buffer
True university autonomy cannot exist while Vice-Chancellors and university boards are appointed directly by the Minister and policy buffers like the NCHE remain sidelined. The new Act must depoliticise senior university appointments and establish an independent, representative body to set long-term higher education policy. - Restore Collegial Governance Among
University Authorities
The OHEA must preserve and strengthen AUKU’s bicameral, collegial structure rather than replace it with a purely corporate model. Institutional autonomy must be anchored in an independent Senate and empowered Faculties, not concentrated in the Vice-Chancellor’s office. - Protect "Extramural" and
Governance Speech
Academic freedom is often narrowly defined as freedom in teaching and research. As Massila demonstrates, academics must also be free to critique internal governance, appraisal policies, and institutional mismanagement without fear of reprisal. - Reform or Carve Out Act 605 for Academics
In Massila, the critic was an external alumna and politician, meaning she was shielded by constitutional free speech principles without risking her livelihood. A serving public university lecturer making the exact same criticisms faces disciplinary charges under Act 605 (specifically Regulation 18(1) of the Second Schedule restricting public statements). If the High Court recognises that debating university governance is vital public-interest speech, statutory gag rules that treat scholars like silent civil servants are constitutionally untenable. - Strengthen Internal Dispute-Resolution
Mechanisms and Independent Ombudsmen
In Massila, the Court noted that resolving deep institutional controversies requires proper dialogue and accountability mechanisms rather than defamation writs. Alongside revitalising the University Constitution's internal appeal channels, lawmakers should establish an independent Higher Education Council or Ombudsman, so academics have a safe, binding forum to challenge arbitrary administrative decisions.
Conclusion
Repealing AUKU will
mean very little to Malaysia’s academic community if the laws that replace it
preserve ministerial control at the top, dismantle collegial self-governance in
the middle, and leave lecturers silenced by disciplinary statutes at the
bottom. Azlianor revealed how easily "university autonomy" can
slide into unchecked managerialism when statutory buffers and internal
constitutional checks fail; Massila confirmed that within and around the
university, the constitutional right to question, critique, and hold leadership
accountable remains non-negotiable. As Parliament prepares to rewrite
Malaysia’s higher education framework, dismantling ministerial and managerial
autocracy while legislating enforceable academic freedom must go hand in hand.
