Thursday, 24 October 2024

A Comparative Analysis of the Freedom of Information Enactments of Selangor and Penang


 


 "Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of ‘secret sessions’: in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism.” (Max Weber)

The Freedom of Information (State of Selangor) Enactment 2011 and the Penang Freedom of Information Enactment 2010 precede the Federal Government’s 2023 commitment to introduce federal freedom of information legislation by over a decade. In furtherance of this federal commitment, nationwide consultations and dialogues with civil society, led by several NGOs such as the Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ), have been held to shape the proposed legislation. Since the proposed federal law is expected to have wider jurisdiction and stronger provisions to secure the public’s right to information than in the two state-level enactments, a comparative analysis of these earlier laws might provide insights into the structure and functioning of FOI legislation in Malaysia. 

The analysis draws no conclusions on the effectiveness of the Selangor and Penang enactments, nor does it support their continuation in their current form. Such findings would require an analysis of how the enactments have served their purpose since they were implemented. The Centre for Independent Journalism offers a detailed assessment of the implementation of the two enactments in its document titled "A Preliminary Assessment of The Early Years of State-Level FOI Enactment Implementation" (2021). The document can be accessed here. 

https://cijmalaysia.net/a-preliminary-assessment-of-the-early-years-of-state-level-foi-enactment-implementation-in-malaysia/  

That said, any analysis of the two enactments must now consider Christopher Chin J’s decision in Harris Mohd Salleh v. Chief Secretary, Government of Malaysia & Ors. [2023] MLRHU 323; [2023] 4 CLJ 744. In that case, the applicant, a former Sabah Chief Minister, applied to the Court to direct the respondents to declassify the investigation report by Malaysian authorities into the crash of Nomad Aircraft 9M-ATZ Crash on 6 June 1976 at Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. 

In allowing an order of Mandamus, Christopher Chin J held, inter-alia that, 

‘. . . the right to information exists as a corollary to the right to free speech. The Federal Constitution seeks to establish an egalitarian society where citizens exercise their right to free speech on facts and reason, not on assumptions and conjecture.’

The judicial recognition of a constitutional right to information will fundamentally affect the interpretation of the two enactments (and indeed in the formulation of any new legislation on the subject). Absent a constitutional right to information, the right to access information under the enactments would have to be decided largely if not entirely by the access provisions of enactments. A prior constitutional right as recognised by the court in Harris Mohd Salleh means that the provisions in both enactments must now be examined against that constitutional right.

The Aims of the State Enactments 

While the common goal of both enactments is to grant access to government-held information, Selangor takes a broader and aspirational approach making explicit connections to transparency and accountability. Penang focuses on the right to access state-made information, without expanding into the broader governance goals that Selangor seeks to address.  

Decentralised System of Access 

In both the Penang and Selangor FOI Enactments, access to information is managed through individual departments, rather than a centralised state agency. This decentralised model means that each department functions as the gatekeeper for the information it holds, with dedicated Information Officers responsible for processing requests, determining eligibility for disclosure, and facilitating access. This structure promotes direct accountability within departments and ensures that requests are handled by those with the best understanding of the records under their control. 

Duty to Produce and Maintain Information 

For FOI legislation to be effective, public authorities must first adopt a responsibility to produce, collect and maintain accessible records. In many jurisdictions, the right to access information under FOI laws is coupled with a duty on government agencies to maintain and safeguard records. This duty is often reinforced by public records laws or archival requirements, which ensure that records are properly managed, stored, and preserved for future access. These laws recognise that without proper record-keeping and safeguards, the right to access information cannot be effectively realised. 

Both Selangor and Penang’s FOI enactments recognise this need. Under both enactments, Information Officers are appointed to every state department. Their duties include the maintenance and care of information in their respective departments and acting as intermediaries between the department and individuals applying for information. The expression and scope of the duties of Information Officers vary in the two enactments but in both enactments, they are the keepers of state information through whom requests for information are made. 

Under section 3 of the Selangor enactment, information officers are appointed for each department and are responsible for recording, maintaining, and archiving information. They must ensure systems are in place to track applications and facilitate access. Emphasis is placed on record-keeping practices, with a structured focus on training, tracking systems, and implementing best practices for managing information. 

Under section 3 of the Penang Enactment, Information Officers are appointed to manage the care, storage, and disposal of information. While Penang also focuses on ensuring proper record maintenance, it places less emphasis on structured training and tracking systems compared to Selangor. 

Information Officers are on the front line of the FOI process in both enactments. Much will depend on them to ensure the objectives of the enactment are met, especially in accessing departmental information. Both legislations expect these officers to not only facilitate information access but also assist those with special difficulties in obtaining the information they seek. However, as a recent account on the Aliran website (https://aliran.com/thinking-allowed-online/swept-under-the-carpet-penangs-freedom-of-information-facade) has shown, information seekers are also likely to be given the run around when they approach a state department for information. The Selangor, but not the Penang enactment, makes it an offence for an Information Officer to destroy, erase, knowingly give wrong or misleading information or wilfully deny or obstruct access to information (S. 18 Selangor Enactment). The punishment could be a fine not exceeding RM 50,000, imprisonment of up to five years, or both. 

Right to Access Information 

Central to any legislation on access to information is how it articulates the right to access information. Both enactments are uncompromising on this point and provide a framework for every person to access information, but they differ in how they express the right to access. Section 5 (1) of Selangor’s enactment states, 

5 (1) Every department shall provide access to every person, information which is within the control of the department unless otherwise exempted with exception in this Enactment. 

When read together with the broad definition of information in the Selangor enactment, an application can be made for almost any information, however trivial, that is obtained, held, or kept in the custody or control of any department or to which any department has reasonable access. In the Selangor enactment, this would include any documents made, amended, modified, transformed, obtained, or received by the department. 

The Penang enactment is equally broad on who may access information (section 5), but the right to access is limited to information that is ‘available’ in the department as opposed to information which is within the ‘control’ or reasonable access of the department as in the Selangor enactment. Another difference arises from Penang’s definition of information which is, ‘any documents made by the department’, making it more restrictive than Selangor’s broader scope. The Selangor definition covers any information in whatever form, including any documents made, amended, modified, transformed, obtained, received, held or kept in the custody or control of any department or to which any department has reasonable access.’ 

‘Persons’ Who May Apply 

The Penang and Selangor Freedom of Information Enactments do not explicitly define the term "person" when referring to who may apply for information. However, when read together with related regulations (Penang) or guidelines (Selangor), the term "person" is interpreted in a broad manner in legal contexts, encompassing both natural persons (individuals), legal persons (corporate entities) and unincorporated bodies such as NGOs.  

The Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Act 388) define “person” as including a body of persons, corporate or unincorporated unless the context otherwise requires. This means, unless specified otherwise in a specific law, the term "person" automatically includes both individuals and entities incorporated and unincorporated.

Application for Information 

Making an application for information under both enactments is straightforward but must be made through prescribed forms. If an applicant is unable to complete the form because of illiteracy or disability, he may make the application orally. In such circumstances, the Information Officer is required to reduce the oral application into writing and provide the applicant with a copy. 

Selangor (s. 6) applications for information require a declaration of the purpose for the application, whereas Penang (s.6) only requires the details of the information applied for. Section (18(1)(a) of the Selangor enactment makes it an offence for information obtained for a declared purpose to be used for another purpose, ‘if the effect is detrimental.’ The section does not specify to whom or how the effect of such use of information must be detrimental. 

The basic cost of making an FOI request in Selangor is RM12; in Penang, it is RM50 for data from a current year, and/or RM100 for other years. 

Responding to an Application 

Both enactments require information requests to be responded in writing to within stipulated time limits which are different in the two enactments. 

Under s. 7 of the Selangor enactment, the department concerned must respond to the request within 30 days of the date of the application. For requests for information related to life or liberty, the department must respond within 7 days. Under s. 7 of the Penang enactment the corresponding periods are 14 days and 48 hours (which can be extended to 7 days). 

There are other differences relating to the duty to respond in the two enactments. Selangor (s. 7 (3) provides that if an application is unclear the department shall use all reasonable efforts to obtain clarification from the applicant within the prescribed time. There is no similar provision in the Penang enactment. However, under the Penang enactment (s. 8 (2)) if an application is made to the wrong Information Officer, he is required to transfer the application to the appropriate Information Officer and inform the applicant. 

Exemptions – Information Exempted from Disclosure 

Both enactments set specific categories of exempted information, which cannot be accessed under the enactments. The Selangor enactment (s. 14) lists three broad categories of exempted information which are; 

(a) Classified information under the Official Secrets Act 1972, which if disclosed would seriously prejudice national security or national defence. 

(b) Confidential information obtained from a third party, another state or an international organisation, which if communicated would constitute an actionable breach of confidence or seriously prejudice the commercial or financial interest of a third party or relations with a state or international organisation from whom the information was obtained. 

(c) Information which if disclosed would prejudice the formulation of policy or development of the state. 

In addition to the above three categories of exempted information, an applicant may also be denied access under the Selangor enactment if the information applied for, 

a.                   Would interfere unreasonably with the operations of the department (s. 10 (3)(a)), 

  1. Would be detrimental to the preservation of information after having regard to the physical nature of the information (s. 10 (3)(b)). 
  1. Would involve an infringement of copyright (other than copyright owned by the State Government) subsisting in the information. In such a case, the information may be provided in a form in which the copyright would not be breached (s. 10 (3)(c)).  
  1. If the information applied for is not in the possession of the department, or (s. 11), 
  1. If the application is vexatious, unreasonable or repetitive (s. 12) 
  1. Would involve the disclosure of personal information of an individual third party unless the third party has consented to the disclosure of the information or the person making the application is the legal guardian of the third party, the legal next of kin or the legal administrator of a deceased third party (s. 13). 

The Penang enactment has a longer list of exempted information which includes most of the types of information exempted under the Selangor enactment. The Penang enactment does not provide for vexatious applications but includes the following exemptions that are not included in the Selangor list of exemptions; 

a.       Information in court proceedings; 

  1. Information affecting the State economy; 
  1. Health and Safety 
  1. Information affecting enforcement or administration of the law; 
  1. Prevention or detection of crime 

The Penang enactment also takes a more protective approach to documents of the State Executive Council and its committees (SEC). The enactment (s. 11 (1) (b)) exempts, 

a.       Documents submitted for consideration by the SEC or created for such purpose. 

  1. Official documents of deliberations and decisions of the SEC. 
  1. Disclosure of information which would be in contempt of the State Legislative Assembly (SLA) if the exemption is required to avoid an infringement of the privileges of the State Legislative Assembly. 

However, the exemptions in (a) and (b) do not apply to documents containing statistical, technical or scientific material unless the disclosure would involve the disclosure of any deliberation or decision made by the State Executive Council (s. 11 (1) (b) (ii)). 

Power to Disclose Exempted Information 

Both enactments empower state departments and the state authority to override the disclosure restrictions on exempted information.  

Under the provisions of the Selangor enactment (15 (1) (b)), the State Government has the discretion to declassify confidential information, so that it may be accessible and give access to exempted information. The Penang enactment (S. 11 (2)(b)) confers a similar discretion on the State Authority. 

Both enactments also impose a duty, as opposed to a discretion (Selangor (s. 15 (1) (a); Penang s. 11 (2)(a)) on a department to grant access to exempted information if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm of disclosure.

Information Officers in both states may allow access to exempted information if the information is required for the investigation of an offence or misconduct (Selangor (s. 15 (1)(c); Penang s. 11 (2)(c)). 

Partial Disclosure 

Both enactments also allow for the disclosure of documents containing exempt information if the exemption information can be redacted from the document (Selangor s. 16; Penang s.12). 

Right to Appeal 

Both enactments establish mechanisms for individuals to appeal decisions on denied access, with independent appeals boards providing oversight. In Selangor, the appeal body is the State Information Board. In Penang, it is the State Appeals Board. Both bodies are established as quasi-judicial tribunals with the power to summon witnesses and take evidence under oath. However, the appeal provisions in the two enactments differ in scope and procedure.

Selangor (s.9) offers a broader range of reasons to appeal. In addition to outright rejection, an appeal can be made for dissatisfaction with the form of disclosure (e.g., incomplete or incorrect information) or delays in receiving the information. Penang (s.9), on the other hand, limits the grounds for appeal to cases where the application for information is rejected.

Moving Forward

The initiative shown by Selangor and Penang in enacting state-level Freedom of Information laws long before the federal government's commitment in 2023 is commendable. The state enactments provide a valuable starting point and can serve as basic models for the new federal legislation. They offer practical insights into how decentralization of information access through departmental-level management and the appointment of Information Officers can function in a legislative framework. The experiences of these states highlight important considerations such as the role of public outreach, the need for structured training, and the importance of having clear exemptions and procedural guidelines.

However, the judicial recognition of a right to information, as seen in the Harris Mohd Salleh v. Chief Secretary Government of Malaysia case in 2023, fundamentally changes the landscape. With this judicial affirmation of the right to information as a constitutional principle, any future FOI laws, including those of Selangor and Penang, must now be interpreted in light of this broader constitutional right. This recognition strengthens the public's access to information and places greater legal weight on the obligations of government bodies to disclose information. It ensures that the provisions of the enactments and the new federal law will be subject to constitutional scrutiny, making the right to information more robust and difficult to curtail arbitrarily. This legal development elevates the state's enactments, allowing them to evolve in line with constitutional principles and setting a high standard for future legislation.

 

Sunday, 22 September 2024

Youth Think Tank invites comments and views on their Higher Education Blueprint Submission

 

Please Join Their Zoom meeting on 27 September 2024 (Friday) at 9 pm

The Higher Education Malaysia Association Inc. (HEYA Inc.) is a non-profit think tank and people's academy involved in youth development and policy reform through higher education. The group is made up of some very dedicated young people.

The group has expressed its views on several aspects of higher education in Malaysia. It has received recognition from the Ministry of Higher Education and has been consulted on higher education policy changes in the past.

HEYA is currently preparing a submission for the Ministry of Higher Education regarding the Ministry’s proposed Higher Education Blueprint. They are seeking ideas and viewpoints of a larger group of stakeholders to give greater relevance to their submission.

Would you be interested in assisting them by attending a Zoom meeting on 27 September 2024 (Friday) at 9 pm?

Your participation would go a long way in helping them write their proposal.

Please contact Mr Ooi Tze Howe at 012 559 5993 for more information. They can also be contacted by email at admin@heya.org.my

The Ministry of Higher Education is conducting a national survey to establish public sentiments on the proposed Blueprint. Please look here-

https://www.mohe.gov.my/en/broadcast/banner/national-survey-the-malaysia-higher-education-blueprint-mheb-2026-2035?highlight=WyJibHVlcHJpbnQiXQ

NATIONAL SURVEY-THE MALAYSIA HIGHER EDUCATION BLUEPRINT (MHEB) 2026-2035

 





NATIONAL SURVEY-THE MALAYSIA HIGHER EDUCATION BLUEPRINT (MHEB) 2026-2035

The Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) is conducting a national survey, inviting feedback from the public on the proposed Blueprint on Higher Education.

Information on the survey can be got from https://www.mohe.gov.my/en/broadcast/banner/national-survey-the-malaysia-higher-education-blueprint-mheb-2026-2035?highlight=WyJibHVlcHJpbnQiXQ==

Please look and respond if you are interested in our higher education.

Tuesday, 16 July 2024

High Court Ruling on EPF Account Mergers: A Cautionary Tale for Families

 

For many people, the savings in an Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) account may be the only savings or legacy left them. The EPF is a critical savings system designed to help a large portion of the population build personal savings for their retirement years. By compelling regular contributions from employees and employers, the EPF ensures that individuals have a financial cushion in their old age. Beyond securing retirement, the EPF also acts as a legacy tool, allowing contributors to pass on their accumulated savings to their families, thereby providing financial stability and support to their loved ones after their passing. This dual purpose marks the importance of the EPF in fostering long-term financial security and intergenerational wealth transfer.

The recent decision of the High Court in Shah Alam in Divyyaa Machap v Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja reveals how public expectations of the fund can be undermined by the interpretation of laws governing the distribution of funds in a deceased contributor’s account.

This unprecedented case involved a contributor who had two EPF accounts. How this happened is not explained in the judgment, but it appears that the First Account was created with the contributor’s old identity card, and the Second Account with his new identity card. While the First Account had no funds in it, it did have a nominated beneficiary. The Second Account contained funds but had no nominated beneficiary.

The two accounts may not have caused any problem to a subsequent claimant to the funds. The beneficiary to the First Account would have found no funds in the First Account whilst claims to the funds in the Second Account would have been determined by the laws relating to the distribution of the estate of deceased persons including the provisions of the Probate and Administration Act 1959.

However, as the Court found, the situation became complicated when the EPF merged these two accounts into a single account. In the process, the Second Account was subsumed into the First Account. EPF’s action effectively deleted or erased the Second Account, leaving the contributor with only the First Account. The effect of the merger was that the account with a nominated beneficiary but which had no funds now had all the funds of the contributor.

The merger led to competing claims to the contributor’s funds upon the contributor’s death; between the named beneficiary to the First Account and the contributor’s daughter, who was the administrator of the contributor’s estate.

The daughter/administrator challenged the EPF’s decision to merge her father’s accounts and its subsequent decision to regard the beneficiary of the First Account as the beneficiary of the merged account.

The Court ruled in favour of the EPF. It decided that while the law did not provide the EPF with the power to merge accounts, there were no provisions within the Act, Regulations, or Rules that explicitly prohibited such action. Consequently, the Court concluded that the EPF was entitled to exercise its administrative powers to merge the contributor’s accounts.

The Court acknowledged that its decision would have a devastating impact on the Plaintiff, but it emphasized that the EPF's role was to perform its duties as mandated by statute, without any vested interest in the outcome. The Court also noted that while the contributor had not nominated a beneficiary for the merged account, he had not cancelled the beneficiary nominated for the First account.

With respect, the decision of the Court is not entirely satisfactory. While it may in some circumstances, be reasonable to imply that EPF had the power to merge accounts as an administrative action, doing so without placing on the EPF a corresponding obligation to inform the account holder about the implications of the merger is clearly unjust. At the very least, the EPF should have requested confirmation from the account holder if he wished to maintain the nominated beneficiary in the merged account. If the EPF was unable for any reason to determine the contributor’s intention, it should not have merged the two accounts which they had obviously approved at the time they were created.

EPF could have assumed from the circumstances that the account holder felt no need to change or cancel the beneficiary he nominated to the First Account as there were no funds in that account and that he did not nominate a beneficiary to the Second Account because he intended the funds in that account to devolve according to the Probate and Administration Act 1959. Contributors may not have named a beneficiary precisely because they intended their savings to be distributed in accordance with laws governing the distribution of estates and not to a single beneficiary. It would therefore be wrong to attribute to the contributor any blame for the events that led to the case.

The case reveals potential pitfalls in the administration of EPF accounts, highlighting the importance for families to establish the intentions of contributors, especially principal breadwinners of the family, regarding the distribution of their EPF savings while the contributor is still alive. However, these are sensitive matters which most families would be reluctant to broach. Hence, it must fall on the EPF to show greater engagement with contributors when they make crucial changes to their accounts and not claim the changes were made as an administrative right.  They must also be engaged to a greater degree in educating the public on the complexities of how the fund is managed through media, trade unions, and employee associations. If an individual is entitled only to a single account, that information must be reiterated to the public, whether it is law, policy or simply an administrative convenience.

Monday, 29 April 2024

A Duty to Prevent Bullying in Schools

 


By

U K Menon & Dr Wan Abdul Manan Wan Muda

The Federal Court’s decision issued on 29 March 2024 of a case of bullying in a government residential school has important implications for how schools, the Ministry of Education, and the Government respond to bullying on school premises. The court's ruling sheds light on the legal obligations and responsibilities related to preventing bullying in educational settings.

The name of the case is not being disclosed to protect the privacy of the students involved, the

Bullying in Schools

Bullying is a problem that has been present in our schools for a long time. Unfortunately, it appears to be getting worse as time goes on. According to the Ministry of Education, there were 4,994 cases of bullying reported until October of last year. This number is even higher than the already worrying 3,887 cases reported in 2022.

Acknowledging this problem, the Ministry of Education, schools, teachers, NGOs, and even the public have implemented strategies to counteract this phenomenon. Most of these strategies are focused on educating the perpetrators and victims of bullying on how to avoid or resist bullying. The Federal Court decision now adds a legal duty on schools and the education system to prevent bullying. It establishes parameters of the duty of care and the standards of safety to prevent this growing scourge.

The case is an extreme instance of bullying that took place in a government residential school. The student victim was assaulted by five students leaving him with injuries that left him deaf in one ear. No reasons for the assault are disclosed in the judgment. The student victim was taken into the quarters of the head prefect where he was continually assaulted in the middle of the night for almost five hours. The perpetrators beat, kicked, and assaulted him in different ways.

Despite the injuries that were inflicted on him, the student victim did not report the incident to the school authorities for fear of reprisals. He only revealed the cause of his injuries when he went for follow-up treatment at a local clinic three days after the assault. It was only then that his father was informed. His father took him to hospital and a police report was made.

The five assailants were charged at the Magistrates' Court for an offence under the Penal Code.  They each pleaded guilty to the charge and were put on good behaviour bonds for two years with a monetary surety of RM1000.00. No conviction was recorded.

The Federal Court’s decision was the culmination of a civil suit the student victim had initiated in the High Court. His action was against his five assailants, the Head of the School, the Senior Assistant in charge of student affairs, the Ministry of Education, and the Government of Malaysia, the latter two on the ground that they were responsible for the actions of the other defendants.

The High Court had decided in favour of the student victim. The judge hearing the case was satisfied that the claim was proved against all the nine defendants named in the suit. The first five defendants for the actual assault, the Head of the School, and his Senior Assistant because the assault took place on the premises of the school and were thus liable for the acts of the first five defendants. The Ministry of Education and the Government of Malaysia were held vicariously liable.

The decision of the High Court was however, reversed by the Court of Appeal which was not satisfied that there was adequate evidence to establish the assault, that the school owed a duty of care, or if there was a duty, the assault in the instance was foreseeable by the school.

The student victim applied for and was granted leave to appeal to the Federal Court, which reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal on all points raised by the latter court.

The Decision of the Federal Court

This note only deals with the Federal Court’s decision on the defendants’ liability for the bullying on the school’s premises. It does not deal with the Court of Appeal’s doubts about whether the assailants’ admission of guilt in the Magistrate’s court was sufficient to establish the civil action in tort for the assault inflicted on the student victim.

About the duty of care to students

The Federal Court emphasised the importance of safety in schools.

‘It goes without saying that schools, residential or otherwise must be safe and conducive for the purpose(s) intended. Otherwise, the providers and consumers of such institutions would face considerable difficulties in enrolment, whether of student or teaching faculty.’

Government schools, established by the Ministry of Education, despite having a physical presence and a name, are not legal entities and as such legal duties cannot be imposed on them. A duty of care for the safety of students and other persons who may be on the premises of the school falls on the teachers, the officials of the school such as the principal and ultimately on the Ministry of Education, and the Government.

Teachers’ Duty to Students

The Federal Court reiterated the special relationship between teachers and similar personnel and the student. Because of that relationship, the teachers owe a duty to the student to take reasonable care for the safety of the student. This includes a duty to supervise the students when the students are within the school to maintain discipline, safety and the wellbeing of the students. The degree of supervision depends on the circumstances of each case. This account of the relationship resonates with the traditional theory that teachers stand in the position of parents (in loco parentis) to their students. Under that theory, teachers are said to have the same power over their students and the same responsibilities as parents over their children.

Duty of the Ministry and the Government

The Federal Court held that the Ministry of Education and the Government of Malaysia also owed a duty to all students enrolled in the school, collectively and individually. According to the Court, these defendants ‘are responsible for their safety, welfare and well-being, and these students are safe from harm, whether caused by conditions of the premises themselves or by others occupying or licenced to be within the premises’. In the instant case, the Federal Court held both the Ministry and the Government vicariously liable for breaches of the duty of care by the school officials and for the actions of the students who assaulted the student victim because the assailants too were registered as students in the school.

Duty of Care to Prevent Bullying in Schools

As stated earlier the apex court’s decision establishes a duty on teachers, other school officials, the Ministry of Education, and the Government to prevent bullying in schools.

The Federal Court also lays down the standard of safeguards that must be implemented against bullying, regardless of whether the school is residential or otherwise. The Court stipulates three areas of action for schools to discharge their duty to prevent bullying.

First, there must be a dissemination of awareness of bullying through posters and other means, which the Court said would serve to prevent bullying.

Next, it stipulates that that the curriculum must include a teaching of values and mutual respect. In this respect, it states that ‘the discipline of students of all ages remains a necessary part of any education curriculum. Basic values of mutual respect for one another must be inculcated in all our young and it should not be left to expensive and unfortunate incidents such as were revealed in the appeal to remind us of these values.’

Thirdly, the Court held that teachers and other similar personnel are under a duty to supervise the students when the students are within the school, for the ultimate purpose of maintaining discipline, safety, and wellbeing of the students. The degree of supervision depends on the circumstances of each case. Evidence in the instant case revealed that spot checks that were normally carried out in the room where the assault took place were not carried out on the night of the incident.

Concluding Remarks

The Federal Court’s decision is based on a case of bullying where physical violence was inflicted on the victim

 Bullying is manifested in many ways. Physical abuse as happened in the instant case is only one way bullying is done in schools. Other forms of bullying can be subtle and covert, creating fear and anxiety in the victims that can be as serious or worse than physical abuse. Although these latter forms of bullying are not dealt with in the Federal Court’s decision, schools and the Ministry must consider them when deciding on ways to prevent bullying.

Finally, while the Federal Court’s decision was based on events in a Government school, it is submitted that the same duty of care will apply to private and international schools and institutions of higher education.

Monday, 22 April 2024

AUKU Amendments - Nothing to Shout About


 Despite claims that they were intended to empower students, the recent amendments to AUKU (Universities and University Colleges Act 1971) which the Dewan Rakyat recently passed, make no significant changes to the rights of students in public universities.

The focus of the change is on the student disciplinary provisions of the principal Act dealing with the collection of money by students or student bodies.  Before the amendment, section 15A of the Act prohibited students or student bodies in a university from collecting money or other property from anyone. However, under those provisions, the Vice Chancellor of the University could, if he thought fit, exempt students from the statutory prohibition.

The amendment changes the words of the old section 15A by providing that a Students’ Representative Council of the University or any student body of the University may, subject to any written law, make, organise, or take part in any collection of money or receive money or any other contributions from any person or body of persons.

The new section 15A does not give students an unconditional right to collect or receive money. The right must be exercised in compliance with any regulations that the University Board may lay down. Thus, whereas under the original provisions, the Vice Chancellor could exempt students from the prohibition in the old section 15A, under the new section 15A, the right to collect money is subject to regulations that the University Board may prescribe.

This means that the extent of the new statutory right can only be established once the University Boards begin to lay down the terms upon which the students may exercise the right. Since the Act does not qualify the discretionary power of the Board to make regulations on the matter, it may well be that the ensuing regulations of the Board will simply revert to the position before the amendment.

The recent amendment may have its origins in one of the eleven New Year's resolutions announced by the previous Minister of Higher Education, Dato Seri Khaled Nordin when he took up his portfolio in early 2023. The previous Minister's eleventh resolution focused on student empowerment, which involved giving students more responsibility and decision-making opportunities within what the Minister said was a broader context of student rights. The Minister was concerned that students were increasingly living and interacting in virtual and digital environments, taking them away from the campus environment. To address this issue, the Minister proposed to allow students to govern campus life themselves, which according to his resolution would involve managing student unions and small businesses such as bookshops, cafeterias, and pharmacies. The Minister proposed that the earnings from these activities could be used to support student activities.

The current Minister of Higher Education, Dato' Seri Diraja Dr Zambry Abd Kadir also spoke about students in higher education in his inaugural speech at Universiti Malaya on 12 January 2024 (Landasan Hala Tuju Kementerian Pendidikan Tinggi 2024). The Minister’s focus was not on student empowerment but on the ‘shaping of minds and characters’ and making higher education a platform for "human transformation" and "culture building" to propel the country into becoming an advanced nation.

Regardless of the origins of the amendment to the Act, the notion that student empowerment merely revolves around the right to raise funds and conduct business activities on campus reflects a profound misunderstanding on the part of the authorities about what student empowerment really means.

Student empowerment within the campus must involve fostering an environment where students feel valued, respected, and empowered to voice their opinions, advocate for their needs, and contribute meaningfully to shaping their educational experiences. It involves fostering a culture of inclusivity, collaboration, and shared governance where students are recognised as integral stakeholders in the university community.

Beyond the campus, it means empowering them to become proactive members of society, capable of effecting positive change and contributing to the betterment of their communities. It's about instilling in students the confidence, skills, and sense of responsibility needed to prepare them to become informed, engaged citizens and leaders in their respective fields.

The amendment introduced by the Act focuses only on students' right to raise funds while overlooking other issues, such as restrictions in the UUCA and the university disciplinary rules that are contrary to the spirit of academic freedom and violate principles of free speech and assembly.

Genuine student empowerment entails recognising and respecting the diverse voices, perspectives, and aspirations within the student body, rather than simply delegating financial responsibilities without addressing the underlying structural barriers and power dynamics that hinder free speech and assembly within the campus.

Friday, 12 January 2024

Ownership and Control of Private Higher Educational Institutions

 


This note is a follow-up to a question raised at the end of a previous article, Private Higher Educational Institutions: Confusion Continues Over Their Status. That question was about ownership and control of private higher educational institutions (PHEIs), established under the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act 1996 (the Act), particularly the division of powers between the regulatory agencies, the company, and the Chief Executive, who is the statutory official appointed to manage the PHEI.

Some of the conclusions from the previous article are repeated here as background to the discussion in this article.

The PHEI is Not an Entity Separate from the Company

1.      The previous article established (i) that a PHEI can only be established by a company registered under the Companies Act, (ii) that the company owns and maintains the PHEI, and (iii) that the PHEI is not a separate entity but is part of the company establishing it, a proposition that is now supported by the Court of Appeal decision in Eagle One Investment Ltd & Others. v. Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn. Bhd.[1]

2.      Confusion over the identity of the PHEI was again an issue in Limkokwing University of Creative Technology International Sdn. Bhd. v. Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Others.[2] In this case, litigants who brought an action in the name of the PHEI were granted leave by the court to amend the claim by substituting the company establishing the PHEI.

3.      The Court of Appeal’s decision in the Eagle One case settles the law that in any legal action concerning the PHEI, the proper plaintiff or defendant is the company establishing the PHEI. Any legal action arising from the activities of a PHEI must be initiated by the company or be brought against the company and not in the name of the PHEI, which to labour a point, is not an entity that can either sue or be sued in a court of law.

4.      If a Private Higher Education Institution (PHEI) is owned by the company establishing it, and is part of the company, then logically, and in keeping with the underlying scheme of the Act, the company is the PHEI. The company enters contracts to carry out the business of the PHEI, whether to build the facilities to support the PHEI and recruit students, demand, refund fees, employ staff or deal with any other contractors.

Any legal action arising from any of these transactions, whether by or against the PHEI must be brought in the name of the company and not in the institution's name. The courts have clarified this much in the cases mentioned earlier and those decisions are in alignment with the Act’s intended scheme of the Act. However, as will be seen, the statutory provisions dealing with the control of the PHEI deviate from the underlying scheme of the Act which places the company establishing the PHEI in control of the institution.

The Act Regulates the PHEI, not the Company

5.      The Act, in many of its provisions treat the PHEI as if it is a legal entity that can be regulated separately from the company. If the PHEI is not a legal entity, it is trite that regulations cannot be directed at it. It must be directed at the company, or any natural person involved in the institution’s operations, but not at the PHEI. The Act, however, directs most of its provisions at the PHEI as if it is a legal entity. Whilst there are also provisions directed at the company and individuals overseeing the institution's operations, most of the regulations are directed at the PHEI. For instance, s. 18(1) provides that the prior approval of the Minister shall be obtained before a private higher educational institution establishes a branch or affiliates, associates or collaborates with other higher educational institutions. It is submitted that this and other similar sections are unenforceable because a PHEI lacks the legal capacity to do any of the actions stipulated. It cannot establish a branch or affiliate or associate with or collaborate with any other institution. Such actions can only be taken by the company establishing the PHEI. Section 18 must therefore be directed at the company and not the PHEI.

6.      As they now stand, many of the Act’s regulatory provisions are unenforceable because they are directed at the PHEI and not the company establishing the PHEI. However, it is submitted that these discrepancies can be overcome if the term ‘private higher educational institution’ is redefined as proposed in the previous article. The proposed definition defines the PHEI as ‘a company carrying on the business of higher education.’ As the proposed definition treats the PHEI as the company, any provision directed at the PHEI will, in effect, be against the company.

Governance, management, and the control of PHEIs

7.       A more vexing question, one that cannot be solved by the proposed definition of PHEI concerns the governance, management, and control of PHEIs. If a PHEI is established and owned by the company, it must follow that management and control must necessarily rest with the company. Regulatory control of the institution (PHEI) must be directed at the company and not the PHEI. All this is obvious from the general scheme of the Act which only allows a company to establish a PHEI. Part III of the Act which deals with the establishment of PHEIs is unambiguous about the role of the company in ensuring adequate facilities for the PHEI, establishing a system of governance and management of the PHEI, and even maintaining standards of education in the proposed PHEI. Notwithstanding these foundational expressions, the Act veers away from them when it deals with the management of PHEIs under Part VI. Instead, the Act attempts to regulate the PHEI through the Minister, the bureaucracy of the ministry, and a statutory appointee with the title of chief executive of the PHEI. Under these statutory provisions, the company’s role in the control and management of the PHEI is minimal.

8.      The two main instruments of control of the PHEI are the constitution of the institution prescribed by the Act and the chief executive who is an officer appointed under the Act to manage the PHEI.

The Prescribed Constitutions

9.      Under s. 30(2) of the Act, PHEIs are to be managed in strict accordance with their constitutions. Before the 2017 amendment of the Act,[3] the contents of the constitution were left to be determined by the company subject to approval by the Registrar General. The changes effected by the 2017 amendments require the constitution to contain provisions that may be prescribed by the Registrar General.[4] The Private Higher Educational Institutions (Constitutions) Regulations 2017 (Constitutions Regulations)[5] issued to give effect to the 2017 changes, prescribe two constitutions, one for universities[6] and the other for colleges.[7]

10.  The prescribed constitutions are based on the model constitution[8] of the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (UUCA) which is an instrument designed for institutions that are fundamentally different from PHEIs. The UUCA University is established as a corporate body through an incorporation order initiated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The UUCA Constitution is the sole instrument that regulates and animates the UUCA University. There is no other regulatory structure imposed by the law than that specified by the First Schedule Constitution. The PHEI, on the other hand, is established by a registered company whose regulatory structure is determined by the Companies Act 2016.

11.  Under the Companies Act 2016, the business and affairs of a company must be managed by, or under the direction of the Board of Directors of the company.[9] Since the sole object of a company establishing a PHEI is to establish and manage a PHEI, it must follow that the PHEI is managed by the Board of Directors. Contrary to these provisions, the prescribed constitutions based on the UUCA constitution, attempt to impose a bicameral system of governance over the PHEI. The two prescribed constitutions separate general governance (Board of Governors) from academic governance and management (Senate). The UUCA University functions and operates through two such organs.

12.  A registered company operates through its shareholders and Board of Directors (BOD). These organs are bound by strict fiduciary duties under the Companies Act and company law, as interpreted by the courts over the past two centuries. Directors, both individually and as a board, are responsible for fulfilling their duties towards the company. However, introducing a separate management structure, such as a BOG and Senate, between the company and the PHEI creates confusion. This is because neither the Companies Act 2016 nor the prescribed constitutions provide clear provisions to reconcile the governance and management structure.

13.  Importantly, no reference is made to section 11 of the Act which makes approval to establish a PHEI dependent on the applicant company’s ability to provide adequate facilities, for the PHEI, adequate and efficient management and administration for the proper conduct of the PHEI and to maintain the standards of education provided by the PHEI and establishing a proper system of governance of the private higher educational institution with a constitution that shall be approved by the Registrar General. Section 11 is unambiguous about the company’s responsibilities for the facilities, governance, management, administration, and academic standards of the PHEI it seeks to establish. It is also clear that the object of the constitution required by s. 11 is to tie the company to the responsibilities stipulated in the same section.

14.  The failure to align the management of the PHEI with the company’s management structure inevitably results in the creation of two separate management regimes, each with different roles and functions that would lead inevitably to uncertainties over questions of legal responsibility and liability.

15.  The preamble to the draft constitutions declares that ‘for the purposes of establishing and managing the University, there has been incorporated a company in Malaysia under the Companies Act 2016’. That declaration is undermined by the rest of the constitution because, if the purpose of the company is to manage the university, then the university must be managed by the Board of Directors of the company, which is where the management powers of the company reside. If, as is provided in the Act, the company is required to manage the university through a constitution, that constitution must be authorised by the company’s Board of Directors and be linked to the company if it is to have any legal effect.

16.  Even if it is to be inferred that the company will adopt the prescribed constitution through its Board of Directors, the terms of the constitution place no such obligation on the company. Yet, it is the company that established the PHEI and is the entity that carries the financial responsibility for the maintenance and operation of the institution. The Act is even silent on the company’s responsibility to maintain the institution financially other than the stipulations on minimum paid-up capital at the establishment of the institution. Nothing in the Act lays down the company’s duty to maintain the operations of the institution or any duty to its employees, or students.

17.  What ensues from these and the provisions relating to the chief executive is an attempt to wrest control over the PHEI from the company and place it under the control of the regulatory authorities. This, it is submitted, is neither practical nor prudent, because it would mean that the ministry by usurping control over the PHEI will end up assuming responsibility for the conduct of the PHEI.

The Chief Executive

18.  The role and position of the chief executive add to the confusion over who controls the PHEI.

19.  The company establishing a PHEI is required under s. 31 to appoint a chief executive whose appointment is subject to the approval of the Registrar General.  The chief executive occupies an enigmatic if not an invidious position under the current provisions of the Act. Straddling the PHEI, the company and the MOHE, the chief executive has to balance many loyalties and navigate through a maze of obligations that are imposed on him by law.  Although appointed by the company, he is subject to directions from the Registrar General and Minster. He is vested with powers that he may exercise without consulting the company yet he is an employee of the company.

20.  The statutory role of the chief executive is, among other things, to exercise general supervision over the arrangements for instruction, administration, day-to-day affairs, welfare, and discipline in the private higher educational institution and all its branches.  Stated in such broad terms, the chief executive is effectively in charge of all the functions and activities of a higher education institution. The company cannot appoint any other person to oversee the operations of the PHEI because under s. 31(4) the duties or functions of a chief executive cannot be carried out by any other person who is not registered as a chief executive. Any person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (4) shall be guilty of an offence.

21.  Although the Act requires the company to appoint the chief executive, it does not describe the chief executive’s relationship or responsibilities to the company. On the other hand, various provisions of the Act hold the chief executive accountable to the Minister and other officials in the Ministry thereby placing the chief executive in a position of conflict.

The Act does not require the chief executive to be appointed to the board of directors of the company but fails to recognise that the chief executive may legally be regarded as a director of the company because of the definition of director in the Companies Act 2016. A director includes a ‘person primarily responsible for the management of the company. . .’ Since the company’s sole object is to establish and manage a PHEI, the chief executive as the manager of that business will legally be a director of the company, whether that was intended by the statutory provisions relating to the chief executive’s appointment.

22.  As mentioned earlier, the intention of the Act in its provisions on the constitution and the chief executive appears to be to place control of the PHEI in the hands of the regulators. This conflicts with the general scheme of the Act as laid down in other provisions of the Act, which is to establish and regulate PHEIs through the agency of registered companies. The registered company provides a ready-made regulated legal entity that is eminently suited for managing a public good such as higher education. Unfortunately, that efficiency is whittled away by those provisions of the Act that were discussed earlier

Conflicting policies

23.  The controls and the uncertainties they engender can be traced to the two conflicting policies on higher education that the Act attempts to resolve.

a.      The first of these was the liberalization and privatization of higher education which put an end to the government’s monopoly over higher education. Two decades earlier the government, through litigation carried to the highest court in the land, resisted a petition brought by a group to establish a private university under the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (UUCA).[10] The decision in the Merdeka University case ended the possibility of private universities being established outside the control of the government.

The Act reverses that position. In its preamble, it recognises the role of private institutions in providing efficient higher educational infrastructure and increasing capacity to meet the demand for higher education.

b.      But the same preamble also emphasizes the need to regulate private education, which is the other policy underpinning the Act. In 1996, when the Act was passed, there was already a large and vibrant private higher education sector which through its initiatives had expanded higher education capacity in the country. Although private colleges could not award degrees, innovative arrangements with local foreign universities allowed them to teach degree courses from those universities. Some even offered courses that allowed local students to complete postgraduate programmes from foreign universities without having to travel to those universities. Despite the great strides made in the sector, private higher education was not regulated by any specific legislation at that time but fell under the insufficient provisions of the Education Act 1961.

The tone of the Act and its regulatory provisions appear to have been formulated to control the sector as it was in 1996 rather than what is made possible by its provisions to create a whole new regime for the regulation of these institutions. The regulatory approach of the Ministry, supported by the inconsistent provisions of the Act, attempts to regulate private higher education in the same manner they were regulated before the enactment of the Act.

What is urgently required is a re-examination of the provisions of the Act to give effect to the purpose of the Act. A new thinking must be developed to support the private sector of higher education to make it more competitive in the rapidly changing environment of global higher education. This requires a clearer streamlining of the regulatory framework.



[1] [2020] 2 MLRA 659

[2] [2023] 5 MLRH 575

[3] Private Higher Educational Institutions (Amendment) Act 2017

[4] Section 30(1) of the Act.

[5] When first passed, the Act allowed the company to determine the terms of the PHEI’s constitution. However, amendments to the Act introduced by the Private Higher Educational Institutions (Amendment) Act 2017 require the constitution to contain provisions that are prescribed by regulations made under the Act. Under the Private Higher Educational Institutions (Constitutions) Regulations 2017 two template constitutions are provided, one for colleges and one for universities that are established under the Act. The (Constitutions) Regulations 2017 are not yet in force.

[7] Subregulation 3(1)(b)

[8] Section 8 of the UUCA and the First Schedule to the Act

[9] Section 211, Companies Act 2016

[10] Merdeka University Berhad v Government of Malaysia, [1982] 2 MLJ 243. Although the main grounds for the High and Federal courts’ rejection of Merdeka University’s challenge of the rejection of the petition were the status of universities under the UUCA as statutory authorities and the issue of the language of instruction that was to be used, there was also a judicial view that the government bore a duty to maintain even private universities that were in financial distress.