Monday, 6 July 2026

Lecturer Challenges University’s KPI-Policies: The Judgment in Azlianor v Universiti Teknikal Melaka


 A Lecturer Challenges Unilateral KPI-Driven Policies

Azlianor v UTeM[1] is a rare instance of a university lecturer resorting to legal action to challenge a university’s exercise of its power over its academic staff.

The High Court, however, dismissed her application after the university amended and reissued the circulars, rendering the dispute “academic”[2]. Because of this, the judgment may not bind future cases in any strong way.

However, despite its limited precedential weight, the judgment reveals how Malaysian courts currently understand university autonomy, academic regulation, and the governance structures created by the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (UUCA). By treating the matter as an administrative dispute, the Court missed an opportunity to examine the special character of the UUCA university as a self‑governing academic community where decisions are made through collegial processes, unlike government departments or other statutory bodies.

The applicant, a senior lecturer at UTeM, applied for judicial review of the university’s decision to impose new KPI requirements, including mandatory publication in indexed journals such as Scopus and Web of Science.

She applied to the High Court for judicial review of the university’s decision on the long‑established grounds of irrationality, unreasonableness, and procedural impropriety, with the further allegation that the changes were introduced mid‑year for immediate implementation in that same year. As stated earlier, the High Court dismissed her application.

Historically, judicial review was only concerned with the decision‑making process where the impugned decision is flawed on the ground of procedural impropriety, i.e., the decision did not follow prescribed procedures. However, over the years, our courts have made inroads into this field of administrative law. The Federal Court in a landmark case[3], held that the decision of inferior tribunals, such as the authorities of a university may be reviewed on the grounds of “illegality”, “irrationality” and “proportionality”, not only on the decision-making process but also on the merits, thus allowing the courts to scrutinise a decision not only for process but also for substance. The upshot of this approach is that an application for judicial review can now examine both procedure and substance of an official decision‑making body or person.

Any person, such as the senior lecturer in this case, who is adversely affected by the decision, action, or omission in relation to the exercise of the public duty or function is entitled to apply for a judicial review.

Summary of the Applicant’s Case

The applicant argued that the two KPI circulars were procedurally improper because they bypassed the Majlis Bersama Jabatan (MBJ), the staff–management forum established under JPA’s 2020 service circular. She contended that the lack of engagement and consultation rendered the circulars invalid and further, that they contravened sections 8 and 26 of the UUCA and section 4(r) of the university’s Constitution.

Substantively, she argued that the mandatory Scopus publication requirement was unreasonable, ignored lecturers’ many other duties, and imposed a punitive score cap of 79.99%. She also highlighted procedural defects: the minutes approving PP 11/2024 were issued after the circular took effect, and PP 23/2024 was not approved by the University’s Board as required. Finally, she asserted that the circulars violated her constitutional rights and imposed an excessive workload, with an unrealistic nine‑month deadline to produce an indexed article.

Autonomy Is Not the Whole Story

The Court emphasised the autonomy of the university and the Vice‑Chancellor. Autonomy is indeed a core principle: it protects universities from political interference. But autonomy is not the only principle embedded in the UUCA. The Act’s Schedule Constitution distributes authority across a wide range of bodies, such as the Board, the Senate, faculties, centres, committees, reflecting a model of governance built on shared deliberation.

This is not accidental. A university is a community of scholars. Its academic policies are meant to emerge from discussion, critique, and collective judgment. Collegial decision-making is therefore not an abstract ideal; it underlies the manner in which Malaysian public universities are governed.

While the Court emphasized the autonomy of the university and the Vice-Chancellor, this external independence is only one facet of the UUCA framework. Autonomy is a foundational principle that shields universities from political interference, yet it does not grant unchecked administrative power, even to the Vice-Chancellor. The UUCA’s Scheduled Constitution explicitly distributes authority across a diverse matrix of statutory bodies—including the Board, the Senate, faculties, centres, and committees. This deliberate statutory design establishes a system of checks and balances, codifying a model of governance rooted in shared deliberation rather than top-down executive command.

This distribution of power is a clear recognition that a university is fundamentally a community of scholars. Academic and institutional policies are legally and structurally designed to emerge from rigorous peer discussion, critique, and collective judgment. Collegial decision-making underlies the lawful governance of Malaysian public universities, ensuring that institutional autonomy from external actors is matched by internal democracy and shared academic responsibility. The UUCA Schedule Constitution even provides for the resolution of disputes between the Authorities of the University (or between an officer and an Authority) regarding the scope of their powers, functions, or jurisdiction may be referred to the Minister, who may determine the matter or appoint an independent Dispute Resolution Panel.[4]

Azlianor’s complaint that the KPI circulars were issued without discussion goes to the heart of the collegial principle. Even if the Majlis Bersama Jabatan (MBJ) was not the correct forum, her grievance was fundamentally about the absence of collegial processes. KPI circulars that directly affect academic work — teaching, research, publication — should logically be deliberated by the Senate. The Court did not consider this. By treating the university as a hierarchical bureaucracy, the judgment ignored the collegial foundations of academic governance.

The Scopus Requirement: A Missed Opportunity for Substantive Review

The Court accepted UTeM’s justification that requiring publication in Scopus‑indexed journals would improve institutional performance. But it did so without asking a basic question: Does publication in Scopus truly measure academic quality or excellence?

Research from the National Higher Education Research Institute (IPPTN)[5] suggests otherwise. As its Issues Paper notes, citation‑based metrics are “simply a measure of visibility (not necessarily positive) and misleadingly used as a proxy for impact.” A paper may be widely cited because it is controversial or flawed; high‑quality work in niche fields may receive few citations. Scopus measures attention, not quality.

The IPPTN paper also warns that once a metric becomes a performance indicator, “it ceases to be a good measure.” Academics naturally shift their behaviour to maximise the metric rather than the underlying academic purpose. A mandatory Scopus requirement risks encouraging quantity over substance, salami‑slicing of publications, and choosing topics that are “publishable” rather than meaningful.

More troublingly, global indexing systems are owned by commercial entities such as Elsevier and Clarivate, which have “replaced the peer/expert colleagues in deciding what excellence is.” In other words, the KPI outsources the definition of academic excellence to private corporations, a move that sits uneasily with the university’s mission to advance knowledge for society.

Under the expanded scope of judicial review recognised by Malaysian courts, the High Court could have examined not only the procedure but also the substance of the KPI. It could have asked whether a one‑size‑fits‑all publication requirement is realistic across disciplines, or whether it distorts academic priorities. These questions were not explored.

What Makes a University a University

These omissions matter because they touch on the very nature of the university. A university is not merely a place that grants degrees or produces research outputs. It is a distinctive kind of institution built on shared inquiry, intellectual independence, and collective responsibility for the advancement of knowledge.

Its governance structures such as the Senate, academic boards, committees, exist to ensure that academic decisions are made through deliberation among scholars. When these structures are bypassed, the university begins to resemble a government department: efficient perhaps but stripped of the intellectual culture that defines its purpose.

A Narrow View of the University

In the end, the Court’s decision affirms autonomy but overlooks collegiality. It upholds managerial authority but ignores the academic community. It treats the university as a public agency rather than a self‑governing institution dedicated to knowledge.

If this trend continues, Malaysian universities risk losing the very qualities that make them universities.

The Azlianor case was an opportunity to reaffirm the principles of collegial governance. It was not taken. The responsibility now falls to academics, policymakers, and civil society to insist that our universities remain what they were meant to be: autonomous, yes, but autonomous in the service of a collegial, self‑governing pursuit of knowledge.

 



[1] [2025] MLRHU 1902

[2] A court decides a case is academic when the underlying controversy has disappeared, the remedy sought is no longer meaningful, or the court’s intervention would be purely theoretical rather than resolving a live dispute.

[3] R Rama Chandran v. Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor 1996] 1 MELR 71; 1996] 1 MLRA 725; 1997] 1 MLJ 145.

[4] See Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (Act 30), First Schedule, section 33.

[5] https://ipptn.usm.my/images/issues_paper/05_IPPTN_Issues_Paper-Quality_Excellence_and_Impact.pdf

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