Tuesday, 26 October 2021

Corporate Liability for Corruption – Should Private Universities and Colleges be concerned?

 Changes made to the laws on corruption in 2020 have generally gone unnoticed by private higher educational institutions and other providers in the private sector of higher education. The new provisions are directed at commercial organizations which clearly include the companies that establish and manage private higher educational institutions under the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act 1996 (Act 555).[i] The implications of the changes on the operation of private universities and colleges are too serious to be ignored.

Liability under s. 17A

The changes introduced through a new s. 17A of the MACC Act 2009 came into operation in June 2020, just as the Covid-19 pandemic was beginning to take hold in the country.  The new provisions make a commercial organization (a term defined by the Act to include registered companies or partnerships) strictly liable for the corrupt conduct of its officials, agents, and other service providers of the organization even if those acts were done without the knowledge of the organization or its officers. Any director, controller, officer, partner, or manager of the commercial organization is deemed personally liable for the same offence.

The penalties are severe. The commercial organizations and its officers are liable to a fine of not less than 10 times the value of the gratification, or RM1 million, whichever is the higher; imprisonment for a term of not more than 20 years; or liable to both fine and imprisonment.

Adequate procedures to prevent corruption

To counter the severity of the offence and the penalties attached to it, s. 17A provides commercial organizations a complete defence to a charge under the section if they can show that they had ‘adequate procedures’ in place to prevent corruption in their operations. Guidelines issued by the Minister indicate what constitutes adequate procedures. Generally, they require commitment at the top level of management and their involvement in the prevention of corruption. The procedures include risk assessment, undertaking control measures, carrying out systematic reviews of those measures, the monitoring and training of staff and the setting up of whistleblower procedures.

It is a defence for directors and officers to prove that the offence was committed without their consent and that they had exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence. The due diligence defence available to directors, controllers and partners is linked to the establishment and monitoring of adequate procedures.

The rationale of s. 17A

The provisions of section 17A reflect a worldwide trend to shift the responsibility of preventing corruption from enforcement agencies to the business organizations themselves. The carrot and stick approach imposes heavy penalties on businesses that benefit from the corrupt behaviour of employees and associates whilst giving them complete protection if they can show that they had instituted adequate procedures in their operational space to prevent corruption. The section will require businesses to be vigilant of corruption risks not only from people within their organizations but of those outside the organisation who fall within the definition of associates.

Who are associates?

The term associates cover a very wide class of persons including those with tenuous links to the organisation such as those who perform services for the organization. Under the section, the question of whether a person performs services for the organization is to be determined not simply by reference to the nature of the relationship between that person and the organization but by reference to all relevant circumstances. The range of persons who would fall within the definition will have to be determined by the courts but the way the section defines associates will require businesses to review how their businesses are affected by agents, suppliers, and others in their supply chain.

Why PHEIs must be concerned

The risk of corruption has been observed to be highest among businesses whose dealings include regular interactions with government agencies. If the normal operation of a business is subject to obtaining regular official approvals and permissions, the corruption risk becomes greater.

PHEIs are creatures of law that are subject to tight regulation by government agencies. They can only be established with the approval of the Minister of Higher Education. The application process involves the submission of many documents to the Ministry and responding to different official inquiries. Once established, the PHEI must then enter another series of interactions with the same Ministry to register the institution. This in turn requires approvals from the local fire department and the local council where the institution is located. Once the institution is in operation, approvals must be obtained from the Ministry to teach a course of study or training programme. Applications must be made to the Malaysian Qualification Agency for accreditation and if foreign students are involved, applications must be made to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (KDN) and Immigration Department. Interactions with different government agencies will continue over the life of the institution. According to a MOHE circular, the Ministry alone processes 23 different types of applications from PHEIs. One of the risks that PHEIs face is the likelihood of government approvals being withdrawn or modified. Act 555 creates uncertainty in many of its provisions where an approval that has been previously granted to a PHEI is withdrawn.

High-risk industry

The range of interactions with government agencies makes the private sector a textbook case of a high-risk industry. This position is compounded by the multitude of contracts that the PHEI typically makes in the ordinary course of its business. These include contracts with marketing and recruiting agents, funding agencies, and foreign universities and their agents, advertisers, newspapers, and the list goes on. These arrangements bring with them people whose actions may not always be within the control of the PHEI but may yet fall within the class of persons defined as associates of the PHEI.

Protecting Senior Officials

Another reason why PHEIs must be concerned with the new law is the exposure of a category of its senior officials to liability under s. 17A. These are officials who are employed because of their academic standing and their role in the management of the institution is limited to the educational processes of the institution. However, because they are concerned in the management of the institution, if an offence is committed under the section they would be caught in the dragnet of the section and be held liable for that offence, even if it was committed by persons far removed from their area of responsibility.

PHEIs must also be concerned because of the heavy penalties the section imposes, which may have a terminal impact on the business.

For these and other reasons not explored here, it would be prudent for PHEIs, whether large or small to institute corruption proofing procedures as a shield against liability under the new law.

 

 

Espact’s team of legal and other specialists can assist you to assess your organization’s current position vis-à-vis the Act and develop adequate procedures in line with the Ministerial Guidelines. Espact’s team also provides briefings for directors and training for staff at all levels to meet the requirements of the defence. For a free consultation, please call 03 7865 5062 during office hours.



[i] Under Act 555, only a registered company may apply to the Minister of Higher Education to establish a private higher education institution, whether a university, university college or a college (s.6)

Thursday, 14 October 2021

Appointment to Universiti Malaya Board Sparks Controversy

 Appointment to Universiti Malaya Board Sparks Controversy

The appointment of a former student of the university to the board of Universiti Malaya sparked a broad range of responses on social media, online news sites, and chat groups of academics. Putting aside the vitriol, the racist remarks, and the personal attacks on the young man, one of the causes of the annoyance was that the appointment was political and that the appointee was too young for that position. Interestingly, the criticisms were targeted mostly at the appointee, not so much the Minister who was responsible for the appointment. University board appointments are matters of public interest and public scrutiny of the appointments will uphold good governance of universities and greater care taken in selecting the right people for the position. In this short blog, we talk about the role of the university board, the profile/composition of the board, the type of skills they must possess, and how they are appointed. We also show a chart showing the current composition of the board of the universities established under the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (the Act)

The University Board

Under the Act, the university board is the highest governing body at the university, overseeing all aspects of the university from finances to student disciplinary rules and even over some academic matters such as the appointment of staff. The extensive powers vested in the university are exercisable only by the board although there are limitations to how the power is exercised. First, the board must recognize the senate’s exclusive jurisdiction over academic matters and must avoid intruding into those powers. If there is a conflict between the board and the senate, there are provisions in the Act for the dispute to be referred to the Minister. Next, the board must recognize the principles of collegial governance that are integral to the Act. Unlike the boards of commercial corporations which have control over the entire company, the university board’s powers over the different constituents of the university such as faculties, institutes, centres, and even officers such as deans and heads of centres are limited by the powers and functions designated to those constituents. It will be misleading to describe the university’s governance structure as bicameral without at the same time mentioning the distribution of powers over the other constituents. In the nomenclature of the Act, the board is only one of many authorities established by the Act.

The Functions of the Board

Notwithstanding the limitations referred to, the functions ascribed to the board are extensive. The Act requires it to provide strategic planning-oversight of the educational character and mission of the University; it must promote efficient and effective management and provide an overall review of university operations; it is required to develop links with the community, corporate sector, and industry and finally foster global linkages and internationalization in higher education and research. As if these were not complex enough, in 1996, additional powers were vested in the board of a commercial nature. The 1996 reform of higher education laws gave the university extensive commercial powers that entitle the board to invest in shares, form partnerships, joint ventures and set up subsidiary corporations with commercial objectives. These powers are as extensive as those exercisable by any corporate business organization. Considering the board’s wide powers and the statutory expectations cast on it, it is obvious that great care must be shown in making appointments to the board and that the appointees are able to execute the statutory expectations. For this, the composition of the board must reflect the different functions ascribed to it. This is where the Act fails. In amending the Act to give the university those commercial powers, no attempt was made to change the statutory composition of the board to support the wider powers conferred on the university.

Membership of the University Board

The membership of the board as mandated by the Act is as follows.

i          A Chairman;

ii         The Vice-Chancellor;

iii       Two officers of the public service;

iv       One person to represent the community at the place where the University is located;

v         One professor of the University elected by the Senate from amongst the members mentioned in paragraph 17(d); and

vi       Five persons comprising three persons from the private sector, one person from the alumni of the University and one other person from within or without the University who, in the opinion of the Minister, have the knowledge and experience which would be of assistance to the Board.

vii     The Deputy Vice-Chancellors, Registrar, Bursar, and Legal Adviser shall be ex-officio members of the Board but shall not be entitled to vote at the meetings of the Board.

With respect, the prescribed profiles do not match the legislative powers and functions of the board.

Appointments to the university board

The powers of appointment to the board of directors are vested in the minister. Obviously, to comply with the statutory prescriptions, any appointment made by the minister must ensure that the appointee fits into the shape of the composition laid down by the Act. It is open to an argument that if a board is not constituted as legally prescribed, any power it exercises or decisions it makes may also be flawed and be challenged in a court.

Further, the minister is also bound by s. 4A of the Act to appoint a committee to advise in the appointment of a qualified and suitable person to the board. It may be worth reproducing the section in full to emphasize its provision.

4A.  For the purpose of selecting a qualified and suitable person for the post of Vice-Chancellor or for any other post to which the Minister has the power to appoint under this Act, the Minister shall, from time to time, appoint a committee to advise him on such appointment.

A recent decision of the High Court has held that the minister’s actions under the section are open to judicial review.

Current Appointments

In conclusion, what is clearly needed is greater transparency and observation of the law in making such appointments. Otherwise, public confidence will be lost in how our universities are managed. The attached chart tells a woeful tale of how appointments have been made without any considerations given to ethnic or gender diversity in the appointment of directors.